CVE-2026-120560 - Active Woot Products Tables for WooCommerce. 100% FREE <= 2.1.5 - Unauthenticated File Deletion via 'wp_columns_actions' and 'table_id' Parameters
CVE ID :CVE-2026-120560
Published : Nov. 7, 2026, 3:28 a.m. | 21 minutes ago
Description :The Active Woot Products Tables for WooCommerce. 100% FREE plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Media Library File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.5 This is due to the `get_table_data()` AJAX handler — registered for unauthenticated access via `wp_ajax_nopriv_woot_get_table_data` — performing no nonce verification and no capability check before passing the attacker-supplied `wp_columns_actions` parameter directly to `apply_filters()` alongside an attacker-controlled integer derived from the `table_id` parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete any WordPress media library attachment and its underlying file in the uploads directory by supplying a known or guessed numeric attachment ID, enabling complete erasure of a site's media library. Exploitation is achievable because WordPress core registers `wp_delete_attachment()` as a callback on hooks such as `upgrader_scheduled_cleanup` and `importer_scheduled_cleanup`, which `sanitize_key()` does not strip; notably, only attachment posts reachable by numeric ID are affected, and files outside `wp-content/uploads` — such as `wp-config.php` or plugin PHP files — cannot be targeted through this path.
Severity: 6.5 | MEDIUM
Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...
Published : Nov. 7, 2026, 3:28 a.m. | 21 minutes ago
Description :The Active Woot Products Tables for WooCommerce. 100% FREE plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Media Library File Deletion in all versions up to, and including, 2.1.5 This is due to the `get_table_data()` AJAX handler — registered for unauthenticated access via `wp_ajax_nopriv_woot_get_table_data` — performing no nonce verification and no capability check before passing the attacker-supplied `wp_columns_actions` parameter directly to `apply_filters()` alongside an attacker-controlled integer derived from the `table_id` parameter. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to delete any WordPress media library attachment and its underlying file in the uploads directory by supplying a known or guessed numeric attachment ID, enabling complete erasure of a site's media library. Exploitation is achievable because WordPress core registers `wp_delete_attachment()` as a callback on hooks such as `upgrader_scheduled_cleanup` and `importer_scheduled_cleanup`, which `sanitize_key()` does not strip; notably, only attachment posts reachable by numeric ID are affected, and files outside `wp-content/uploads` — such as `wp-config.php` or plugin PHP files — cannot be targeted through this path.
Severity: 6.5 | MEDIUM
Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...