CVE-2026-9188 - Appointment Bookings for Zoom GoogleMeet and more – Wappointment <= 2.7.6 - Unauthenticated Insecure Direct Object Reference via Predictable 'edit_key' / 'appointmentkey' Parameter
CVE ID :CVE-2026-9188
Published : July 2, 2026, 8:33 a.m. | 2 hours, 10 minutes ago
Description :The Appointment Bookings for Zoom GoogleMeet and more – Wappointment plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to and including 2.7.6 via the `appointmentkey` parameter due to the appointment `edit_key` — the sole authorization token consumed by `tryCancel()` — being generated as a predictable, unsalted MD5 hash of only `client_id` (a sequential integer), `start_at` (a publicly observable appointment timestamp), and `staff_id` (a small enumerable integer), with no secret salt or random component, and the unauthenticated cancellation and rescheduling REST endpoints performing no ownership or identity verification beyond matching this reconstructible key. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to compute valid `edit_key` values for appointments belonging to other users and cancel or reschedule those appointments arbitrarily. Exploitation requires the `allow_cancellation` or `allow_rescheduling` setting to be enabled on the site, both of which are common configurations for active booking deployments; an attacker can obtain the inputs needed to reconstruct a victim's key by booking their own appointment to observe their sequential `client_id` and correlating publicly visible appointment times and enumerable staff identifiers.
Severity: 0.0 | NA
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Published : July 2, 2026, 8:33 a.m. | 2 hours, 10 minutes ago
Description :The Appointment Bookings for Zoom GoogleMeet and more – Wappointment plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Insecure Direct Object Reference in all versions up to and including 2.7.6 via the `appointmentkey` parameter due to the appointment `edit_key` — the sole authorization token consumed by `tryCancel()` — being generated as a predictable, unsalted MD5 hash of only `client_id` (a sequential integer), `start_at` (a publicly observable appointment timestamp), and `staff_id` (a small enumerable integer), with no secret salt or random component, and the unauthenticated cancellation and rescheduling REST endpoints performing no ownership or identity verification beyond matching this reconstructible key. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to compute valid `edit_key` values for appointments belonging to other users and cancel or reschedule those appointments arbitrarily. Exploitation requires the `allow_cancellation` or `allow_rescheduling` setting to be enabled on the site, both of which are common configurations for active booking deployments; an attacker can obtain the inputs needed to reconstruct a victim's key by booking their own appointment to observe their sequential `client_id` and correlating publicly visible appointment times and enumerable staff identifiers.
Severity: 0.0 | NA
Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...