CVE-2026-104768 - AutomatorWP <= 6.0.4 - Unauthenticated Privilege Escalation to Insufficient Role Validation in Anonymous Automation 'Role' Option
CVE ID :CVE-2026-104768
Published : Nov. 7, 2026, 11:26 a.m. | 30 minutes ago
Description :The AutomatorWP – No-Code Workflow Automation, Integration & Webhooks Plugin, now with AI plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 6.0.4. This is due to missing privilege-ceiling validation in the `create_user()` function within the anonymous-user action (and equally in the Create User and Add/Change Role WordPress-integration actions), which verify only that the submitted role exists via `automatorwp_get_editable_roles()` without confirming the role falls at or below the acting context's privilege level — allowing attacker-controlled trigger tag data (e.g., a `{comment_author}` tag bound to the Role option) to supply any role, including `administrator`, unchallenged. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to create a new administrator-role account tied to an attacker-controlled email address, receiving the generated password via WordPress's new-user notification email and thereby gaining full administrative access to the site. Exploitation requires the site to have an anonymous automation configured with the Role option bound to a dynamic trigger tag such as `{comment_author}`, and is triggered when a site administrator performs the routine action of approving a comment — an action that provides no in-UI indication that it will mint a new privileged account from the comment author field.
Severity: 7.5 | HIGH
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Published : Nov. 7, 2026, 11:26 a.m. | 30 minutes ago
Description :The AutomatorWP – No-Code Workflow Automation, Integration & Webhooks Plugin, now with AI plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Privilege Escalation in all versions up to, and including, 6.0.4. This is due to missing privilege-ceiling validation in the `create_user()` function within the anonymous-user action (and equally in the Create User and Add/Change Role WordPress-integration actions), which verify only that the submitted role exists via `automatorwp_get_editable_roles()` without confirming the role falls at or below the acting context's privilege level — allowing attacker-controlled trigger tag data (e.g., a `{comment_author}` tag bound to the Role option) to supply any role, including `administrator`, unchallenged. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to create a new administrator-role account tied to an attacker-controlled email address, receiving the generated password via WordPress's new-user notification email and thereby gaining full administrative access to the site. Exploitation requires the site to have an anonymous automation configured with the Role option bound to a dynamic trigger tag such as `{comment_author}`, and is triggered when a site administrator performs the routine action of approving a comment — an action that provides no in-UI indication that it will mint a new privileged account from the comment author field.
Severity: 7.5 | HIGH
Visit the link for more details, such as CVSS details, affected products, timeline, and more...